Introduction
The Community Treatment Order (CTO) was introduced by the Mental Health Act 2007, and from the start, it was controversial. There is evidence that even the principle of community compulsion was opposed by a majority of psychiatrists, 2 and it was said that many would resign rather than implement CTOs. Happily, that prediction has not been realised. In fact, it seems that many psychiatrists, and more than one Approved Mental Health Professional (AMHP), have seized upon CTOs with something approaching alacrity.
In the seventeen months after 3 November 2008, when the changes came into effect, 6,237 CTOs were made; and as at 31 March 2010, there were 4,272 of them still in place. 3 In fact, recent estimates published by the Mental Health Alliance suggest that by the end of July 2010, over 7,000 CTOs had been made and the numbers were still rising. 4 If we consider another set of figures, however, it seems something else is going on.
According to the Mental Health Minimum Dataset, between 1 April 2008 and 31 March 2009, there were about 32,600 detentions under the Mental Health Act. 5 That 'headline' figure is virtually the same as in the previous year, but it hides significantly different ethnic trends: while the proportion of detained patients in the 'White' census category fell, by 1.6 per cent, that of 'Black/Black British' patients rose, by 9.7 per cent. Patients in the 'Black/Black British' category accounted for 12.3 per cent of those detained ', Annual Figures, England 2009 /10, pages 4 & 13. 4. Mental Health Alliance, August 2010 , Briefing Paper 2 -'Supervised Community Treatment', pages 2, 5 & 6. 5. HSCIC, November 2009 , Mental Health Bulletin: Third report from Mental Health Minimum Dataset annual returns, 2004 -2009 in hospital under the Mental Health Act. While that might be worrying in itself, it is made more so by the fact that patients in this category represented fully 18 per cent of those on CTOs. 6 We know that black patients form a greater proportion of the detained than of the general population of the United Kingdom: if they form a still greater proportion of community patients, that is surely an even greater cause for concern. They might, of course, be finding it easier than white patients to gain at least some form of discharge; but equally, they might be finding it harder absolutely to gain their discharge. Those 'back-door' methods were threefold: guardianship, extended leave and supervised discharge.
Before the CTO
Supervised discharge had a relatively brief life. Introduced in 1996, 8 it was abolished by the Mental Health Act 2007 and disappeared entirely nearly two years ago. 9 A patient on supervised discharge might have been made subject to conditions concerning residence, attendance and access. 10 These were the only conditions that could be applied, and yet a study published in 1998 found that in a third of cases in which supervised discharge was used, the patient was subject to a requirement that he accept medication. 11
As much as a decade before the CTO, therefore, it seems some clinicians were finding imaginative, if unlawful, ways of bolstering their control of patients in the community. The same might be said of leave, but only to a degree.
In section 17, the Mental Health Act 1983 says a detained patient may be given leave of absence. 12 Such leave may be granted only by the patient's Responsible Clinician (RC), and it may be made subject to conditions. The RC enjoys wide discretion in that regard. Act 1995 . 9. Mental Health Act 2007 ['MHA 2007 , section 55 & Schedule 11, Part 5. This strange republic of the good Community treatment orders and their conditions 16. MHA 1983 , section 17(2A). 17. R v Hallstrom, ex parte W [1986 ] QB 1090 . 18. B v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Community Healthcare NHS Trust [1999 ] 1 FLR 106. 19. R (DR) v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2002 ] MHLR 386. 20. R (CS) v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2002 ] MHLR 355. 21. Brenda Hale, 'Mental Health Law', Sweet & Maxwell, 2010 , 5th edition, page 252. 22. MHA 1983 , section 17B(3). 23. John Stuart Mill, 'On Liberty', 1859 Now, of course, if a RC is to give a patient leave for more than seven consecutive days, he or she must first consider using a CTO. 16 That is because of changes made by the Mental Health Act 2007, and those changes were themselves prompted by a line of cases on leave of absence. In 1986, the High Court said a patient's detention could not be renewed while he was on leave, and that he could not be recalled to hospital simply to enable renewal to take place. 17 Since then, however, things have gone the other way. In 1999, the Court of Appeal said detention could be renewed during leave, provided the treatment contained some elements of in-patient care. 18 And in 2002: the High Court said it was sufficient that a patient was attending the hospital two-days-a-week, for occupational therapy and the ward round; 19 and it upheld the refusal to discharge a patient who was only attending hospital every four weeks, for a ward round and injections. 20
Reflecting upon this state-of-affairs, Brenda Hale, has asked whether CTOs were in fact necessary:
"Once the courts had increased the flexibility of long term leave of absence, where was the need to introduce another power to achieve something not quite as effective?"
She concludes: "The situation needs to be watched". 21
Making conditions
Conditions are, of course, a significant element of a community treatment order. Every CTO will have at least two of them: a patient must make himself available for examination, both when the prospect of renewal presents itself and when a SOAD certificate is required. 22 If a CTO were confined to those mandatory conditions, all would be fine; it is the possibility of discretionary conditions that is most troubling. There are civil liberty concerns, of course, but they are apt to be over-stated. If one wanted to make a civil liberties case for the CTO, for example, one might seek to draw attention to the bigger picture. Consider, for example, John Stuart Mill, that 'Saint of Rationalism' (as Gladstone called him), who perhaps did most to elucidate the liberal ideal. Mill argued that some of the poor should be prevented by law from having children. 23 It should not surprise us, therefore, that some have tried to see the good in the CTO. The British Psychological Society, for example, said community compulsion might "offer a better 'least restrictive alternative' than the [un-amended] Act, which permits only admission". 24 Even the Richardson Committee was in favour. 25 The longer-term treatment order the Committee proposed would, of course, have been made by a mental health tribunal. But crucially, it would have been available on an in-patient or a community basis.
26. Ibid, paragraph 5.106(i). 27. Ibid, paragraph 5.106(ii) & (iv). 28. Ibid, paragraph 5.106(iv). 29. MHA 1983 , section 17B(2). 30. Mental Health Bill 2006 , clause 25. 31. JCHR, op cit, paragraphs 38-58. 32. MHA 1983 , section 17B(2). 33. MHA 1983 a) Any conditions would be set out in the order itself, and they would be based on the committee's key principle of reciprocity: the compulsory order would identify "the services which the health or social services NHS Trust or other service provider is required to provide". 26
b) The patient would have to reside in a particular place and make himself available for visits by care workers. 27
c) The conditions would cut both ways: the Richardson Committee envisaged a "parallel obligation" on the care team to keep appointments. 28 In fact, the amended Act is a good deal less prescriptive about the conditions of a CTO. We are told that they may only be ones that the RC thinks "necessary or appropriate" for certain purposes. That is a disjunctive test, but it does not posit two equal alternatives: 'appropriate' will always suffice; and whereas something can be 'appropriate' even if it isn't 'necessary', anything 'necessary' is surely also 'appropriate'. So 'necessary' is never actually necessary.
The Mental Health Bill 2006 was quite specific as to the types of condition that could be added to a CTO: 30 a) That the patient reside at a particular place.
b) That he make himself available at particular times and places for the purposes of medical treatment.
c) That he receive medical treatment in accordance with the RC's directions.
d) That he make himself available for examination.
e) That he abstain from particular conduct.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights was, however, concerned that the parameters were vague; so vague that they might permit conditions that breached a patient's privacy rights. 31 The government's response was to be even less specific. 
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This strange republic of the good Community treatment orders and their conditions 34. Ibid, paragraph 25.33. 35. JCHR, op cit. 36 The breadth of its possible conditions has, of course, led to the community treatment order being described as a 'mental health ASBO '. 36 A question often arises as to whether any discretionary conditions must be agreed by the patient to whom a CTO will apply: It seems they must. There is nothing in the Act to say that, of course, but the Minister did tell Parliament:
"[…] if an individual did not accept the conditions of the CTO, it would not work so there would be no point giving it in the first place. This is not about saying, 'This is what you are going to do', with the person sitting there saying, 'I don't accept any of that', because a CTO will not be given if the individual does not accept the conditions." 37
That message is reinforced in subsequent guidance (although the Code of Practice speaks not of the patient 'accepting' the conditions, but of his "agreeing to keep" them). 38 But what of someone who is in no position properly to register an objection? May an incapable patient ever be put on a CTO? Neither the Act nor the guidance tells us, but the logic of the position -a community patient must both understand and accept what is expected of him -suggests that he may not.
Challenging conditions
There is no direct way of challenging the conditions of a CTO; not in the legislation, at least. An amendment providing a right of appeal was defeated in Parliament. The government said it was not necessary, because no condition could be made that the patient had not agreed. Concern persists, however, despite the government's attempts at reassurance. 39 The Human Rights Committee, for example, has noted that under the 2004 Draft Bill, the CTO, its conditions and, indeed, the treatment plan would have had to be approved by the tribunal. The Committee said the need to obtain AMHP approval would not be a significant safeguard, as the AMHP might not be truly independent of the RC and the clinical team. It recommended that the requirement for any conditions to be proportionate should be enshrined in statute, and that every community patient should have right to have his conditions reviewed by the mental health tribunal. 40 
See

Deprivation of liberty
It is in the nature of CTO conditions that they dictate the terms upon which a community patient may engage with the world. At the most benevolent level, he will have to visit hospital every so often, and perhaps stay away from the Red Lion on a Saturday night.
Despite the government's best intentions, 41 it is at least possible that community patients will have their liberty restricted, to the extent that we shall have to ask whether, in truth, they are deprived of liberty. The Joint Committee on Human Rights is but one of the organisations that have expressed concern about this. 42 But it is not just in respect of the CTO that such concern now arises. 43 First, there is the ASBO.
There must be a real possibility that a community patient will feel as though he is the subject of an AntiSocial Behaviour Order (ASBO). But the ASBO is apparently, and perhaps thankfully, 44 a thing of the past. 45 Next, however, there is conditional discharge.
The Mental Health Act contains special provisions for people who suffer from mental disorder and are convicted of a criminal offence. If necessary, they can be placed under restrictions in hospital and conditions can be attached to their eventual discharge. 46 The High Court has held that to impose a condition requiring a patient to remain at the hospital from which he has ostensibly been discharged will amount to an unlawful deprivation of liberty, 47 and also, that if they are very strict, even community arrangements might have that result. 48 And then there are 'control orders'.
The Government has long been frustrated by those whom it suspects, but cannot prove, to have been involved in terrorism. The 'control order' is the latest of several attempted solutions and it allows someone to be placed under often stringent conditions. By definition, those conditions cannot engage Article 5 of the Human European Convention on Human Rights, so they must not amount to deprivation of liberty. 49 The most significant decision was made by the House of Lords. It concerned six men, whose control orders confined them to their one-bedroom flats for all but six hours-a-day; allowed those premises to be searched by the police; restricted the areas the men could visit when out-of-doors and required them to wear electronic tags; limited their use of communications equipment; and prohibited them from meeting anyone not authorised by the Home Office. Their Lordships said those orders breached Article 5 and were therefore unlawful. 50 And finally, there are the DoLS.
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This strange republic of the good Community treatment orders and their conditions 51. MHA 2007, section 17 & 18. 55. For example: Nielsen v Denmark (1988) 11 EHRR 175; HM v Switzerland (2002) 38 EHRR 314; Storck v Germany (2005) 43 EHRR 96; JE v Surrey County Council [2006] EWHC (Fam) 3459. 56. A Local Authority v A, B, C, D & E and the Equality and Human Rights Commission [2010] EWHC 978 (Fam) . Of course, DoLS conditions differ from CTO conditions: they are directed at the detainor, not the detained; and, as that language -'detainor' and 'detained' -makes plain, they only come into effect where someone is already deprived of liberty; they are not what might deprive him of liberty in the first place. In one way, however, those involved in a DoLS admission are in the same position as those involved in conditional discharge or a control order: they need to know what it means to be deprived of liberty. That is no small thing.
Regrettably, the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards have no clear idea of that which their name connotes: the legislation is silent on the point and the Code of Practice is only slightly more forthcoming. It says we have to look to the cases. 55 Clearly, that is not just mental capacity cases, but across the board; from conditional discharge to control orders. Yet once we do that, the picture becomes less, not more, clear. The cases say, for example, that although the control order suspects confined to their homes for hours on end were deprived of liberty, two females who are locked in their bedrooms over night are not. 56 For different reasons, then, those who make or are subject to Community Treatment Orders find common cause with people involved in conditional discharge, control orders and the DoLS: they are all doomed to frustration when they try to find out what it means to be deprived of liberty. 
The Great Confinement
Discussion
The Community Treatment Order, then, has proved troublingly popular and maybe, in the manner of both its construction and its use, just plain troubling. Its effect is not, however, entirely novel: leave, and even supervised discharge, have long been used -distorted, maybe -to similar effect.
It will be uncomfortable for those involved with CTOs, and more so for those involved with people who suffer from dementia or a learning disability, to have to calibrate their care according to the restrictions placed on terror-suspects. But that seems to be the way of the world. 
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